Weak title, I know. Shut up. In On Human Rights we discussed how a right should be constructed and whether more modern definitions passed the logical test or not. Despite the fact that these ‘rights’ are dependent upon the coercion of other people, many leftists contend that they are fully complementary with the older conception of rights. We have already had a glimpse of their contradictory nature, but it would nevertheless be instructive to take a deeper look into what must be given up in order to establish one’s ‘positive rights’.

Perhaps the best way to proceed is to distill the original and revisionist definitions down to their most basic essence: ‘Life, liberty, propety’ vs. ‘freedom from want and fear’. Although many (most?) leftist societies over the years have shown a shocking lack of concern for the individual’s life, we’ll restrict ourselves to the two more obvious dichotomies in the above comparison: ‘liberty vs. freedom from fear’ and ‘property vs. freedom from want’. Now, these aren’t perfect distinctions as there is considerable overlap between the two, but it does serve as a useful framework for moving our conception forward (and also prevents us from having to use 4 dimensional graphs *shudder*…instead you’ll once again be subject to the glory of my MSPaint skills).

Freedom from Fear vs. Liberty
The first dichotomy to be addressed is that between one’s right to autonomy vs. another’s ‘right’ not to be perturbed. Legislation regarding codes of behavior, actions, and weapons which may be deemed ‘threatening’ are examples of protection of this latter ‘right’. Some of the more egregious examples of this kind of law-making are the infamous UK ‘asbo’s (restrictions on ‘antisocial behavior’), weapons disarmament laws, and such laws that outlaw specific forms of speech or expression deemed ‘hurtful’ or ‘hateful’.

Now, ostensibly, fear is a sort of harm, and thus if one’s actions instill fear in another, they can be said to be unethical. However, a problem arises in that unlike other forms of harm such as slander, bodily injury, or theft, fear is an internal rather than an external state. As such, ‘fear’ cannot be measured, it cannot be standardized, it cannot rise above the level of opinion. Fear may be caused by the presence of armed citizenry (a common defense of civilian disarmament legislation), or it may be caused by the lack of a welfare state (as FDR and the UN contend), or, it may be caused by something as irrational as the existence of a 210lb person of color in one’s vicinity (as in many people who would see me walking the streets of North London late at night):

In the left planel, Green feared Red’s gun and the fact that he would often drive around at 2 or even 3 am. Red never directly harmed him, but he was always afraid Red would. And so the Greens pushed for legislation both restricting civilian carry and instituting citywide curfews in the right panel. Now, although Green hasn’t realized it he’s caged himself./em> Green himself can no longer do either of those things even if he wanted to. Both of their actions are more circumscribed than they had been. And although Green hasn’t been shot or otherwise harmed by Red, he hadn’t been under the old laws either.

The problem is that the very word fear implies that the action hasn’t caused harm yet, but is believed to be able to. Restriction based on fear thus results in the presumption of guilt before innocence. ‘He could be a murderous bastard. Maybe he shouldn’t be allowed out after dark. Curfew!” Or “Well, theoretically a folding knife can be used in a crime, therefore we should make owning them illegal.” A ‘right to be free from fear’ would eventually restrict far more than it would enable.

Freedom from Want vs. Property
‘Rights’ included under this heading include those of ‘right to a standard of living’, ‘right to healthcare’, ‘right to education’, and even such lunacies as the ‘right to maternity leave’ conceived of by the UN. These have probably been beaten to death over the past few essays so I’ll restrict myself to the point, (made for about the 9th time), that these so-called ‘rights’ can only be maintained through the coerced economic contribution of others. This of course requires the abrogation of property rights in the name of ‘furthering economic freedom’. Thus, each ‘right’ to freedom from a specific want increases the size of the levee upon personal property, and therefore limits what one may do with the fruits of his own labor.

Putting it together with the ‘right’ to be free of fear, we end up with the following picture:

The left panel shows what life was like before Green heard FDR’s wrong-headed speeches. Each man had his own sphere of autonomy, both with regard to action (the Red and the Dark Green circles) and with regard to his personal property (the Bright Green halos). Unfortunately, Green soon impressed upon people the idea that no one should have to suffer the ‘ills of want and fear’. And so government was made arbiter of these ‘rights’. Government restricted how each man could act, even if said actions hurt no one. And it took this one step further, commandeering a portion of his property and returning it in services (Blue). While both men saw the return of at least some of the value of the property, both again lost the ability to do with all of it as they so chose. Whether a ‘beneficiary’ or a ‘victim’ of these revisionist rights, one sees his autonomy significantly constrained.

Conclusion
The conclusion, as before, is that although these ‘positive rights’ may improve an individual’s personal situation, they do so by restricting all individuals’ behavior. They thus limit freedom, and contravene ‘negative’ rights. To quote On Human Rights,
“they are better thought of as privileges. Privileges are those things society accords individuals which–rather than being ways one can be limited–are means by which an individual’s state of being is enhanced by the deeds and economic contribution of others. Guaranteed privileges (which are what revisionist rights in actuality are) require the enforced participation of other members of society. Therefore, societally-protected privileges by their very nature restrict the right of every member of said community to do as one so chooses.”

In political discourse, it sometimes becomes necessary to contemplate societally-enforced privileges. A widely accepted example includes the ‘right to a trial by a jury of one’s peers’ (which can only be done through the coercion of members of the jury pool). The important point is that if we are to defend liberty, we must call a restriction by its proper name, that we be cognizant of the fact that, beneficial though it may be, a coerced privilege is by its nature a limitation of freedom rather than an extension of it.